The EU and the Consent of the Governed

In the course of recorded history, Europe has been a nation in conflict with itself. Home to twenty official languages and many cultures and social philosophies, achieving political harmony is a daunting and continuing task. However, the elements of a desire to be free from war and destitution and competition from the economic behemoth, the United States, have encouraged cooperation and collaboration never before imagined in Europe. Still, the fruit of that cooperation, the European Union (EU), is something of a paradox to conventional free-market libertarians. The economies of scale and lower trade restrictions that would be promoted by such free-market advocates is counterbalanced by the intentional and necessary surrender of national sovereignty to the regional political body. The distrust and differences of opinion that characterized Europe for centuries are not easily overcome, and like all political bodies, there is no guarantee that any solution obtained under the rules of the organization will result in the best possible conclusion. However, if nothing else, the new political ties that bind most of Europe appear to promote economic and political stability. By accomplishing this, businesses within the region and throughout the world can more safely invest their capital in member countries and, by doing so, promote the economic and social improvement of the citizens of those countries—as well as the financial success of the corporations themselves. Even so, the EU should not become blinded by its success. The fall of the Soviet Union provided the alliance with new member states and candidates, but failing to learn the lessons of the struggle against centrally controlled economies may doom it to become indistinguishable from the failed system it opposed for the better part of the last century.

Europe is comprised of many nations that, together, have been the hotbed of many violent and nonviolent disputes throughout the course of recorded history. Before the two world wars of the twentieth century, Europe provided the staging grounds for not only international conflicts such as the Punic Wars, the Hundred Years’ War, the Thirty Years’ War, and the Napoleonic Wars, but also internal revolutions in countries such as England and France that set the stage for other conflicts that included the Americas. As European powers realized the difficulty in achieving domination over outside territories and the fruitlessness of the failure of those efforts, they gradually adopted a general policy of conflict avoidance and maintenance of the political status quo among the territories within Europe. In the meantime, the United States was in a position, being far removed from such political struggles, to adopt a stance of neutrality towards the warring powers in Europe. Neutrality worked very well for United States, and partially because it faced no major external threat to its sovereignty and partially because of its libertarian economic and political ideals, it was able to build a vast industrial and military empire that was able to compete with, as its eventual participation in both world wars demonstrated, the very European powers that spawned its political prowess. In fact, the United States eventually displaced every individual European power in economic capacity.

After the Second World War, much of Europe was in ruins. An effort to reconstruct Europe was put into effect, and a system of open communications and collaborative debate was instituted through the UN to help avoid future international conflicts. Additionally, a network of European nations sought and achieved economic cooperation on the grounds that governments would be less likely to attack a country if the financial success of its citizens were dependent on the willing cooperation of that nation. To facilitate that cooperation, several nations adopted a collection of treaties that eventually came to be known as the European Union. The principles that formed this union are based in principles that most free-market advocates would request. They include the freedom to move people, capital, goods, and services among member nations, which would presumably reduce the cost of living and improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of member nations. Other nations could benefit from such an alliance as well. Instead of adopting the expense of sending delegations to each member nation in order to facilitate trade agreements, countries would need to send a single delegation. Once the Euro was adopted as an official currency of trade in 1999, outside countries could do business with the EU—including through direct foreign investments—with a reasonable faith that the currency would remain stable, and could thus assume less political and currency risk.

The drawback to such consolidation is the surrender of sovereignty that member countries must permit in order to achieve such financial heights and economies of scale. No longer can peoples ask their direct representatives to unilaterally protect particular industries within their countries against what they might consider unfair business or economic practices of international corporations or the countries from which they came. Such decisions to withdraw favorable trade policies are subject to the negotiation authority and approval of the august European body. Additionally, all EU members are expected to promote a particular social agenda that has included the abolition of the death penalty and the promotion of abortion clinics—not only in member nations, but across the globe. The danger in promoting any social policy is in adopting and being forced to continue bad policy because of a persistent economic interest if and when social norms change. In theory, the EU could always change its rules as cultural values change, but it does not account for changes in values of particular countries in spite of the binding effect of the EU agreements. Consequently, member countries whose peoples’ consciences cannot countenance the proliferation of certain values would be forced to support those values if it wanted to remain a member and retain the economic benefits of the EU. People who would be inclined to do so may use this knowledge to blackmail member countries into accepting unpalatable demands of the union. Consequently, the surrender of such sovereignty forces nations to choose between two or more undesirable outcomes, and thus dilutes the countries’ capacity to create and live under laws of their own choosing. Even though this ideological paradox would otherwise disqualify every nation from joining the democracy-promoting body, thus far they have been able to achieve a measure of economic and social success.

The first success of the European Union must be measured by the evident lack of major armed conflicts occurring in Europe since implementation of the various treaties that established the international economic cooperation. While a causal relationship cannot be proved, the fact that Eastern European countries that were formerly part of the Soviet bloc during the Cold War are seeking membership in the EU seems to indicate that all countries—even former enemies and developing nations—believe that there is more to be gained from cooperation than can be achieved through irrational paranoia and military conquest. Wars and the threat of wars, after all, require the attention of the inhabitants of the participant nations at the expense of other industries. Additionally, countries formerly operating under a system of centralized control are now developing market-oriented systems that will enable them entry into the EU. Although every nation is not there yet, the EU has touted not only the economic improvement of these nations, but also the quality of entire categories of essential products—such as agriculture—due to the cooperation made possible by the EU. As a result, consumable products will be made safer and, with the speed and ease at which they can be transported under the formal arrangement, available to a demanding public. The same holds true for any number of industries throughout Europe.

In a continent torn asunder by conquest, political uncertainty, and economic volatility, the European Union has exceeded the expectations of many casual observers. The premise for this skepticism might be explained by the public’s disbelief that the end to the Soviet empire was even a remote possibility. The color of war prevents grand economic cooperation because everyone is looked upon with rightful suspicion. As a result of the attention that must be paid to warding off possible attacks, little attention can be dedicated to anything else. It can be said with reasonable certainty today that Soviet communism was a flawed system that was due to fail as a result of its flaws. However, that certainty is derived only from hindsight. It is easy to forget that throughout the twentieth century, many nations either fell to the Soviet empire or had sufficient reason to fear that their countries would. If they were not being threatened by the Soviet Union’s military might, they were being threatened by willing accomplices in their own countries who embraced the Soviet empire’s ideals of centralized controls, forced redistribution of wealth, and separation of governance. While reflecting on this recent history, it would be wise for the member nations of the European Union to pay heed to the threat of centralized control and degrees of separation between the ruling and the ruled. Reduced trade barriers may be universally good, but it is unsustainable if the governed are not given adequate choices regarding their maintenance. Instability, thus, is less likely to result from war between the nations of the EU, but through internal revolution meant to restore the perceived or actual loss of sovereignty to a political body that does not represent the will of the governed.