Reflections on Love and Fear, Hearts and Minds
The strategic relationship between love and fear has never been more apparent than in the current U.S. campaign to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis. The idea is a noble one: Provide peace and security through force while simultaneously robbing the insurgency of even the desire to level an attack against either the U.S. forces or the goals they are trying to achieve. Yet, history has shown that the success of any such strategy by one sovereign nation occupying another has been tepid, at best, unless the conquerors first completely subjugated the enemy nation by making it too painful to resist by force. Today, measures needed to eviscerate resistance are considered “draconian,” but it still remains the most effective way to quell insurgency within a population. On the other hand, it is also necessary to remain just, for utilizing the weight of military might indiscriminately will only breed hatred, and success will only last as long as the occupying power has the will and resources to continue occupation. To truly inspire a just society that both fears and loves the government, military, or people that invaded their land, a wise nation will be fierce in targeting rebellious groups initially, but will get out of the way as soon as possible. It is a strategy that is only partly being implemented in Iraq, as the U.S. is trying desperately to get out of the way, but is taking half-measures in targeting the rebellious groups in order to gain their favor. However, their favor can only be gained if the insurgency is defeated utterly. Even though the quality of a strategy that focuses on one nation in a regional struggle can be legitimately questioned, it is useful to examine the strategy on its merits while granting its assumptions.
Alexander is called "The Great" out of admiration for the span of his empire. His was among the very first "Hearts and Minds" campaigns in the history of the world; it certainly experienced some of the earliest successes. As Alexander overcame each civilization, he would adopt some of their habits and absorb some of their cultures. This helped ease the pain for his conquests, but some of his own people resented the integration of cultures, and a select few of them eventually made Alexander pay. It should be noted that Alexander would have never had success with the "Hearts" campaign, had he not subjugated their minds first.
On the other hand, Attila the Hun made few friends in his conquests of the Holy Roman Empire (and everything else he conquered or pillaged), and the rule of his subjects depended entirely on his ability to wield the might of his hordes at the slightest provocation. While many provinces were forced to pay tribute to Attila over the years or risk being sacked, they only did so out of fear for their own survival--not out of any amiability for the Huns. While tradition holds that Attila died by drowning in his own drunken nosebleed (if I had a dime every time that happened…) recent studies suggest that he may have been assassinated.
Similarly, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki were clearly about forcing capitulation out of fear of destruction, but the victorious nations in World War II later embarked on a long campaign to rebuild both Germany and Japan, where General Douglas MacArthur famously called for immediate charity to ward off future wars. Importantly, rebuilding could not have been initiated until those nations were first docile and under control. Neither Germany nor Japan was encouraged to abandon their cultural uniqueness—a demand that would have likely bred hatred—but they were forced to abandon some of their political traditions.
In Vietnam, the quest to win the hearts of one group of people was sought at the same time as the quest to destroy their brethren. This campaign met with very limited success. After peace was made between the U.S. and North Vietnam, the U.S. withdrew from the country, and the North easily defeated South Vietnam. The U.S. had to relocate thousands of friendly and peaceful exiles, whose hearts the U.S. had apparently won in defeat. The enemy, it seems, still did not fear the U.S.
Fear is an important tool of instruction; it is central to providing meaningful security. Any time people are fearless enough to raise arms against the occupying power, they do not possess the requisite fear to facilitate a secure state. The ruling authority must always seek to respond to crimes that have already been committed, when security requires the criminals be too fearful to commit any crimes. The administration of true justice prevents fear from becoming hatred. Beyond the mere administration of true justice, the people must also perceive the conquerors just if the conquerors wish to achieve some measure of docility.
There are only a few circumstances that would engender love in the conquered for the conquerors. However, love is more likely to be given if the third party does not conquer at all, but only aids in the overthrow of a despotic regime. For awhile, France was viewed quite favorably in the U.S. after the Revolutionary War, even in many influential circles up through the Reign of Terror and Napoleon's rule. But France didn't conquer the U.S.; that country just aided the U.S. in doing what its people wanted to do anyway. Key to the success of the intervention is that the U.S. was left free to govern itself, and its people were worthy of self-government.
They, for instance, protected the ability to acquire, possess, and accumulate property. This is difficult to impose on any people more inclined to desire government intervention and centrally controlled economies, as in countries ruled by autocratic despots. Apathy, in spite of its poor reputation, is useful, since it implies society’s other needs are met. Apathy means people are concerned with their day-to-day affairs, and are not concerned with who is ruling them. Paradoxically, this also means the ruling power can get away with more, which makes it all the more important for honest people to be running the government, as distrust and dissatisfaction sow the seeds of revolution. Apathetic people do not raise arms against their own government.
At least initially, it is important for people to have some semblance of control over the affairs closest to them. Therefore, very little should be centrally controlled in a large, diversely populated country. The model should be the original Constitution for the United States of America, where the powers granted to the federal government were finite and limited, and the powers granted to the states were infinite and unlimited. A bill of rights, while its perceived value is understandable, is not as important as a strict bill of specific powers. Leave all else to the provinces or the people, where the play a larger role in their respective spheres of influence, even if this means that certain standards do not mirror those of the West. Occupying power may grant lots of food in the short term, but these donations must cease as soon as possible to discourage unnatural dependence.
Only after a period of time that people adhere to the dictates of justice, unhampered by unnecessary and overbearing government intrusion will they begin to trust the government that rules over them, and thus will they subscribe to the necessity and legitimacy of the law. By the time this occurs, the occupying power will be long gone. It is doubtful that in the post-colonization age, an occupied country will trust its occupiers to rule over them perpetually. If embarking on a quest that will lead to occupation, peace can only be won by securing the minds before trying to capture the hearts of the populace. Retribution for revolt must be swift, painful, and public. Coverage of the event must be decidedly favorable to sway public opinion. Therefore, clandestine operations to suppress unfavorable media must be authorized in the short term—say—the first five to ten years.
When occupying a foreign nation, administering swift justice and enforcing order, overtures of peace from rival factions must be accepted in good faith. To facilitate the acceptance of peaceful means to solve grievances, the ruling power must welcome serious representatives of amity into the fold quickly and completely. Once their character has been vetted, their leadership within their communities can and should be promoted to engender trust in the system, if not the ruling power. As soon as security is established, troops are trained, and the new government is in good standing, the foreign power must leave the theater of operations to function in a remote area within the country. To ensure the continuation of the process, they may accept assignments to ward off foreign threats, but not local brigands. An armed population can ward off such threats, and they will grow tired of the behavior of insurgents and terrorists sooner rather than later, if they have the means at their disposal to combat it.
However, none of this is possible if the militant or terrorist factions are not first utterly subjected to the ruling power.
Alexander is called "The Great" out of admiration for the span of his empire. His was among the very first "Hearts and Minds" campaigns in the history of the world; it certainly experienced some of the earliest successes. As Alexander overcame each civilization, he would adopt some of their habits and absorb some of their cultures. This helped ease the pain for his conquests, but some of his own people resented the integration of cultures, and a select few of them eventually made Alexander pay. It should be noted that Alexander would have never had success with the "Hearts" campaign, had he not subjugated their minds first.
On the other hand, Attila the Hun made few friends in his conquests of the Holy Roman Empire (and everything else he conquered or pillaged), and the rule of his subjects depended entirely on his ability to wield the might of his hordes at the slightest provocation. While many provinces were forced to pay tribute to Attila over the years or risk being sacked, they only did so out of fear for their own survival--not out of any amiability for the Huns. While tradition holds that Attila died by drowning in his own drunken nosebleed (if I had a dime every time that happened…) recent studies suggest that he may have been assassinated.
Similarly, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki were clearly about forcing capitulation out of fear of destruction, but the victorious nations in World War II later embarked on a long campaign to rebuild both Germany and Japan, where General Douglas MacArthur famously called for immediate charity to ward off future wars. Importantly, rebuilding could not have been initiated until those nations were first docile and under control. Neither Germany nor Japan was encouraged to abandon their cultural uniqueness—a demand that would have likely bred hatred—but they were forced to abandon some of their political traditions.
In Vietnam, the quest to win the hearts of one group of people was sought at the same time as the quest to destroy their brethren. This campaign met with very limited success. After peace was made between the U.S. and North Vietnam, the U.S. withdrew from the country, and the North easily defeated South Vietnam. The U.S. had to relocate thousands of friendly and peaceful exiles, whose hearts the U.S. had apparently won in defeat. The enemy, it seems, still did not fear the U.S.
Fear is an important tool of instruction; it is central to providing meaningful security. Any time people are fearless enough to raise arms against the occupying power, they do not possess the requisite fear to facilitate a secure state. The ruling authority must always seek to respond to crimes that have already been committed, when security requires the criminals be too fearful to commit any crimes. The administration of true justice prevents fear from becoming hatred. Beyond the mere administration of true justice, the people must also perceive the conquerors just if the conquerors wish to achieve some measure of docility.
There are only a few circumstances that would engender love in the conquered for the conquerors. However, love is more likely to be given if the third party does not conquer at all, but only aids in the overthrow of a despotic regime. For awhile, France was viewed quite favorably in the U.S. after the Revolutionary War, even in many influential circles up through the Reign of Terror and Napoleon's rule. But France didn't conquer the U.S.; that country just aided the U.S. in doing what its people wanted to do anyway. Key to the success of the intervention is that the U.S. was left free to govern itself, and its people were worthy of self-government.
They, for instance, protected the ability to acquire, possess, and accumulate property. This is difficult to impose on any people more inclined to desire government intervention and centrally controlled economies, as in countries ruled by autocratic despots. Apathy, in spite of its poor reputation, is useful, since it implies society’s other needs are met. Apathy means people are concerned with their day-to-day affairs, and are not concerned with who is ruling them. Paradoxically, this also means the ruling power can get away with more, which makes it all the more important for honest people to be running the government, as distrust and dissatisfaction sow the seeds of revolution. Apathetic people do not raise arms against their own government.
At least initially, it is important for people to have some semblance of control over the affairs closest to them. Therefore, very little should be centrally controlled in a large, diversely populated country. The model should be the original Constitution for the United States of America, where the powers granted to the federal government were finite and limited, and the powers granted to the states were infinite and unlimited. A bill of rights, while its perceived value is understandable, is not as important as a strict bill of specific powers. Leave all else to the provinces or the people, where the play a larger role in their respective spheres of influence, even if this means that certain standards do not mirror those of the West. Occupying power may grant lots of food in the short term, but these donations must cease as soon as possible to discourage unnatural dependence.
Only after a period of time that people adhere to the dictates of justice, unhampered by unnecessary and overbearing government intrusion will they begin to trust the government that rules over them, and thus will they subscribe to the necessity and legitimacy of the law. By the time this occurs, the occupying power will be long gone. It is doubtful that in the post-colonization age, an occupied country will trust its occupiers to rule over them perpetually. If embarking on a quest that will lead to occupation, peace can only be won by securing the minds before trying to capture the hearts of the populace. Retribution for revolt must be swift, painful, and public. Coverage of the event must be decidedly favorable to sway public opinion. Therefore, clandestine operations to suppress unfavorable media must be authorized in the short term—say—the first five to ten years.
When occupying a foreign nation, administering swift justice and enforcing order, overtures of peace from rival factions must be accepted in good faith. To facilitate the acceptance of peaceful means to solve grievances, the ruling power must welcome serious representatives of amity into the fold quickly and completely. Once their character has been vetted, their leadership within their communities can and should be promoted to engender trust in the system, if not the ruling power. As soon as security is established, troops are trained, and the new government is in good standing, the foreign power must leave the theater of operations to function in a remote area within the country. To ensure the continuation of the process, they may accept assignments to ward off foreign threats, but not local brigands. An armed population can ward off such threats, and they will grow tired of the behavior of insurgents and terrorists sooner rather than later, if they have the means at their disposal to combat it.
However, none of this is possible if the militant or terrorist factions are not first utterly subjected to the ruling power.
posted by Cameron Beck at 8:15 AM
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